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The Lusi mud volcano in Sidoarjo, East Java, was first noticed by local 
villagers at 5 am on the 29
th
 May 2006. It started to erupt 150 m from the Banjar 
Panji-1 gas exploration well (Fig. 1) two days after the Yogyakarta Earthquake (5:54 
am 27
th
 May 2006), has displaced 13,000 families and led to 13 fatalities. The trigger 
for the mud volcano has been the subject of significant debate (Davies et al., 2007; 
Manga 2007; Mazzini et al., 2007; Davies et al., 2008; Tingay et al., 2008).   
 
The Sawolo et al., (2009) paper assesses and then dismisses the possibility that 
there was a subsurface blowout (breakdown of the structural integrity of the well) 
caused by a kick in the well (an influx of water or gas from surrounding formations) 




 May 2006.  For the subsurface blowout to have 
occurred, the pressure of the fluid (drilling mud, water, gas) in the unprotected section 
of the well has to exceed the maximum pressure the well can tolerate, which is 
estimated by a pressure test known as a leak off test (LOT).  To reach this conclusion 
Sawolo et al. (2009) estimate what we deem to be an unrealistically high leak off 
pressure (LOP) and unrealistically low pressure within the borehole during the kick.  
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Here we counter the main arguments made by Sawolo et al., (2009), pointing 
out inaccuracies, incorrect interpretations and deviations from the daily drilling report 
(the factual account of daily operations). We also take this opportunity to describe for 
the first time direct evidence that the well was the cause of the mud volcano.  Lastly 
we show that their claim of an earthquake trigger is not supported by the mud log data 




Figure 1 a:  Banjar Panji-1 well after the kick on 28
th
 May 2006 with postulated flow 
path for fluids initially erupted by the Lusi mud volcano (after Davies et al., 2008) b: 
Satellite photo of Lusi (August 2009). 
 
What pressure could the well tolerate? 
 
The estimated LOP proposed by Sawolo et al., (2009) is 16.4 ppg (19.27 
MPa/km) measured at 1091 m (1 ppg = 1.175 MPa/km).  In determining the leak off 
pressure (LOP), industry accepted practice is to take the inflexion point on a pressure 
build-up curve (Bell, 1996; Enever et al., 1996; Addis et al., 1998; Jørgensen & 
Fejerskov, 1998; Økland et al., 2002; Raaen et al., 2006; van Oort & Vargo, 2008).  
Based upon the pressure versus time plot (their figure 11), using this method the leak 
off was 15.8 ppg (18.57 MPa/km).  The rationale stated by Sawolo et al., (2009) for 


































































pressure is less reliable when using oil-based muds and they suggest that the „fracture 
closure pressure‟ was used instead. 
 
The fracture closure pressure (FCP) is generally considered to be equal to the 
minimum principal stress magnitude and thus equal to the pressure required to open 
any pre-existing fractures. Hence, the FCP can be an accurate value to use as 
formation strength. However, the 16.4 ppg (19.27 MPa/km) value suggested by 
Sawolo et al., (2009) as the „fracture closure pressure‟ is in contravention of all 
techniques for estimating FCP. FCP is determined by carefully monitoring the 
pressure decay in the well after the pumps are turned off (Enever et al., 1996; 
Jørgensen and Fejerskov, 1998; Raaen et al., 2006). The FCP can then be estimated 
from the pressure decay curve by a variety of methods, with the double tangent or root 
time methods most commonly used (Enever et al., 1993; Raaen et al., 2006). These 
techniques all require the pressure decay to be monitored for a long duration after the 
pumps are shut-in (generally >10 minutes; Enever et al., 1996; Jørgensen & Fejerskov, 
1998; Raaen et al., 2006). Furthermore, FCP is also almost universally observed to be 
less than or equal to the LOP, as the leak-off pressure involves fracture initiation and 
thus must overcome both the minimum principal stress and the rock‟s tensile strength 
(Breckels and van Eekelen, 1982; Gaarenstroom et al., 1993; Tingay et al., 2009). 
However, in stark contrast to all industry conventions, Sawolo et al. (2009) have 
selected their „fracture closure pressure‟ as the pressure at which the leak-off test 
stabilized before the pumps were turned off and a value that is much greater than the 
15.8 ppg (18.57 MPa/km) LOP. Furthermore, the leak-off test only recorded pressures 
for three minutes after the pumps were switched off, and it is impossible to reliably 
measure FCP in such a brief period. Indeed, the 16.4 ppg (19.27 MPa/km) pressure 
reported by Sawolo et al., (2009) as „fracture closure pressure‟ most likely represents 
the fracture propagation pressure (FPP) and is not a value used to estimate formation 
strength by any industry standards (Jørgensen & Fejerskov, 1998; Økland et al., 2002; 
Raaen et al., 2006; van Oort & Vargo, 2008). 
 
As FCP cannot be determined from the leak-off test data available, the only 
value for fracture strength than can be utilized from the data in figure 11 of Sawolo et 
al., (2009) is the 15.8 ppg (18.57 MPa/km) leak-off pressure determined from the 


































































(2009) argue that this value is unreliable when using oil-based muds due to their 
compressibility. Using oil-based muds does indeed affect the reliability of leak-off 
tests, but it does not just affect the estimate of LOP alone. The compressibility of oil-
based muds, in addition to their thermal expansion and gel strength, can cause a 
change in the mud density with depth, meaning that pressures obtained by summing 
surface gauge values and the static mud density may vary from the true pressure at the 
test depth (van Oort & Vargo, 2008), thus making any pressure reading (LOP, FCP, 
FPP, etc) potentially unreliable. Note that the use of oil-based muds does not change 
the way we pick the point of leak-off or fracture closure on the pressure-time plot, but 
simply affects the static mud column pressure used in calculating these pressures (van 
Oort & Vargo, 2008). However, the influence of depth and temperature on leak-off 
tests with oil-based muds can be determined, and it is known that surface gauge 
derived leak-off pressures conducted at shallow depths in regions of high geothermal 
gradient, such as in Banjar Panji-1, are likely to be overestimates of the true formation 
strength (van Oort & Vargo, 2008).  
 
In summary, the 16.4 ppg (19.27 MPa/km) value of formation strength derived 
by Sawolo et al., (2009) is incorrectly reported as the „fracture closure pressure‟. The 
16.4 ppg (19.27 MPa/km) pressure is actually the fracture propagation pressure and is 
not a value that should be used for formation strength. Indeed, the fracture closure 
pressure cannot be determined from the LOT data, leaving the LOP of 15.8 ppg 
(18.57 MPa/km) as the only potential formation strength value that can be determined 
from the data provided by Sawolo et al. (2009). Furthermore, this value is likely to be 
an overestimate of the formation strength due to the influence of mud compressibility, 
mud thermal expansion. In addition, Sawolo et al. (2009) have not provided LOT 
pressures from the other two surface gauges, in particular from the casing pressure 
gauge, which typically reveal the common overestimate of drill-pipe pressure based 
LOPs due to pumping pressure surges.  Thus, the 16.4 ppg (19.27 MPa/km) value 
used by Sawolo et al., (2009) is an erroneous value to use, is contrary to all industry 
practices and is an extensive overestimation of formation strength. Lastly, it should be 
noted that formation strength is determined principally for essential drilling safety as a 
value that should never be exceeded. Hence, when given the option of multiple 


































































lowest possible value for leak-off pressure. Sawolo et al., (2009) did the opposite; 
they picked the maximum possible value reached during the leak-off test. 
 
Did the pressure in the well exceed the pressure the well could tolerate? 
 
If one were to disregard all the reasons provided above accept their value of 
16.4 ppg (19.27 MPa/km) as the pressure the well could tolerate, was this 
overestimate of the pressure that the well could tolerate exceeded?  There are several 
methods for estimating the pressure in the unprotected section of the wellbore (from 
1091 m to 2834 m).  It is generally accepted that after a kick has occurred the most 
accurate method for calculating the pressure at the last casing shoe is to use the 
density of the mud in the drill-pipe, because there is a float valve at the base of the 
drill pipe (see their figure 7) which prevents any contamination of the drilling mud 
and therefore its density is not changed. Mud was pumped through the drill pipe 
during the initial casing pressure build-up ensuring the opening of the drill pipe float 
valve and accurate pressure measurement.  Also the valve has within it a small hole 
allowing pressure communication. If one uses this method then the minimum pressure 
at the last casing point (1091 m) was estimated by Davies et al., (2008) to be 21.29 
MPa. This is higher than what we propose is the overestimated pressure the well 
could tolerate 16.4 ppg (19.27 MPa/km) which at the depth of 1091 m was 21.03 MPa 
(Davies et al., 2008). 
 
In order to conclude that the pressure in the well did not exceed the pressure 
the well could tolerate, Sawolo et al., (2009) had to make two incorrect assumptions, 
firstly they used the „fill-up method‟ for estimating the pressure at the bottom of the 
hole and secondly they assumed the mud density had not changed as a result of the 
kick.  The fill up method uses the level of the mud column after losses have occurred 
at the bottom of the hole as an indication of the pressure at the bottom of the hole.   
This is estimated to be 12.8 ppg (15.04 MPa/km).  This estimated pressure is less than 
the 14.7 ppg (17.27 MPa/km) mud weight that the well was using when it took the 
kick (influx).  This in itself suggests that the 12.8 ppg (15.04 MPa/km) is a significant 
underestimate of the maximum pore pressure of the hole (a kick requires the pore 
pressure to be higher than the pressure of the mud in the well). The fill-up method is 


































































fluid, which can produce reasonably accurate estimates of the mud level and hence the 
fracture gradient of the loss zone. But in this case filling up was occurring while mud 
was being lost from the hole into the surrounding strata.  There could have not been 
any differentiation between mud volume lost, mud volume used to fill the hole or the 
volume of any formation fluid influx. No information is gained on pore pressure, 
fracture gradient or whether formation fluid influx has occurred using this method 
when losses are taking place.  Therefore their method for estimating the pore pressure 
is not appropriate.  Furthermore they then assume that density of the fluid in the 
wellbore has not been affected by the kick 14.7 ppg (17.27 MPa/km) – their figure 8.  
Only by making these two convenient assumptions could they reach the conclusion 
they have.  The result is misleading and essentially contrived. 
 
Is it worth also adding that other techniques noted for estimating pore pressure, 
such as the influx tests and D-exponent used by Sawalo et al., (2009) are also not 
relevant in this case, primarily due to the lithology being that of low porosity 
volcanics (and not the sands often reported). Influx tests are only applicable in 
permeable formations – yet a low porosity volcanic rock with less than 5% porosity is 
hardly likely to be permeable. The D-exponent was designed for shales and looks for 
changes in drilling rate due to changes in pressure – but again this is unlikely to be 
relevant in low porosity volcanic rocks.  
 
There can be no doubt that the well pressures exceeded what the well could 
tolerate. This is evident because there were static mud losses (mud lost when there 
was no movement of the drill pipe or pumping). Sawolo et al., (2009) state that there 
were surface indications that the well was „static‟ but there was no verification that 
the well was „static‟ with a 14.7 ppg (17.27 MPa/km) mud column or that the well 
was static downhole.  
 
Was the well controlled? 
 
At 11:00 am on 28
th
 May 2006 the blow out preventors were opened and there 
was no flow of drilling mud, water or gas (Table 1).  However they also record that by 
14:30 on the same day that „Jar stop functioning‟ and that the „well appeared to have 


































































preventors without any surface flow taking place.  Opening the blowout preventors 
and witnessing no flow does not demonstrate the well was under control. Insufficient 
mud had been pumped into the well during volumetric well control to establish a 14.7 
ppg (17.27 MPa/km) mud column down to the level of the bit, never mind the bottom 
of the hole. A well that required 14.7 ppg (17.27 MPa/km) to control the gas levels 
during drilling can never be under control until a 14.7 ppg (17.27 MPa/km) mud 
column is established from surface to bottom of the hole.  
 
We propose that the lack of flow up the well and the inability to circulate mud 
on the 28
th
 of May was because a bridge or pack-off formed a complete pressure seal 
in the annulus above the bit (illustrated in Fig. 1a). The first casing pressure bleed off 
with no associated decline in drill pipe pressure would indicate that annulus plugging 
was a factor that may have influenced surface pressure readings (marked 1 in Fig. 2). 
This is confirmed by the lack of any surface annulus pressure, even when the blow out 
preventor was closed. Hence the drill pipe pressure was a valid monitor of the 
pressure on the formation below the annulus pack-off. If this were the case then the 
slow leak off of drill pipe pressure (marked 2 in Fig. 2) is leakage of mud through 
fractures (i.e. direct evidence for the failure of the well).  
 
 
Figure 2  Pressure plot of the drill pipe and casing during shut in.  Region marked 1 is 
a period when mud was being pumped into the drill pipe so the drill pipe pressure is 
high, but there is no change in pressure in the casing.  This shows that there was a 


































































marked 2 marks a period when there was no activity at the rig, but pressure was 
declining.  This indicates fluids were leaking from the open-hole section. 
  
Other arguments against the blowout hypothesis 
 
Sawolo et al., (2009) propose several other lines of argument to suggest that 
the Lusi mud volcano is not the result of a blowout. They present shallow sonan and 
temperature logs collected when the Banjar Panji-1 well was re-entered approximately 
7 weeks after Lusi began to erupt. These logs indicate that no fluid was flowing up the 
inside or close against the outside of the borehole. However, they fail to point out that 
Banjar Panji-1 was plugged with cement which would prevent fluids coming up the 
well above the plugs. Furthermore, fluids will only flow up the outside of the well if 
there is poor cementing of the casing and no other pathways for the fluids to go. 
Hence, lack of fluids flowing up or on the outside of the wellbore two months after 
the eruption started does not indicate that an underground blowout did not occur. 
 
The re-entry of the Banjar Panji-1 well also indicated that the drill bit was still 
stuck in the original depth. Sawolo et al., (2009) argue that the bit should have fallen 
into the well and thus there is no blowout occurring. However, the drill bit can remain 
stuck in position during blowouts, particularly in zones of highly swelling clays and in 
wells that have had large volumes of cement pumped into them. Hence, the bit being 
stuck in its original location again does not prove an underground blowout was not 
ongoing. 
 
Sawolo et al. (2009) argue that the Kujung carbonates, suggested to be a 
possible source of water erupting from Lusi (Davies et al., 2007), cannot produce the 
high rates of water erupting from Lusi. However, a common mistake made by Sawolo 
et al. (2009) and others is to assume that the carbonate formation targeted by Banjar 
Panji-1 is the Kujung carbonates. Strontium 86-87 analysis from the Porong-1 well, 
which targeted the same deep carbonates just 7 km away, revealed that these 
carbonates are 16 million years old and thus cannot be the 30-35 Ma Kujung 
carbonates (Kusumastuti et al., 2002). Hence, it is not relevant to use data from the 
Kujung Formation as evidence against a blowout. Indeed, the use of the Kujung 


































































drilling of Banjar Panji-1: prediction of pore pressure and casing points using offset 
wells far offshore that target the Kujung Formation. It seems quite unusual that such 
distant offset wells were used for well planning instead of data and evidence from 
Lapindo‟s adjacent Porong-1 well. 
 




 May 2006, a day after the eruption had started, while the drill rig 
was still on site the daily drilling reports states: 
 
 „05:00 to 14:00 Evacuated all drilling crew into safe area (Muster point). Gas and 
water bubbles blew intermittently with maximum height of 25 ft, and elapse time 5 
minutes between bubble.  Pump down string with a total of 130 bbls 14.7 ppg mud, 
followed by 100 bbls 14.7 ppg. Bubbles intensity reduced and elapse time between 
each bubbles is longer‟.   
 
The pumping the 130 barrels and then 100 barrels of 14.7 ppg (17.27 
MPa/km) mud caused a reduction in the rate of flow to the surface.  The reason for 
pumping the mud was to stop the flow by increasing the pressure exerted by the mud 
column in the well and slowing the rate of flux of fluid from surrounding formations.  
The observation that pumping mud into the hole caused a reduction in eruption rate 
indicates a direct link between the wellbore and the eruption. 
 
The Yogyakarta earthquake 
 
Sawolo et al., (2009) imply in their abstract, table 1 summarizing the drilling 
operations, and their conclusion, that the magnitude 6.3 Yogyakarta earthquake 
located 250 km away led to the loss of mud from the well and initiated a set of 
processes that culminated in the eruption.  Here we critically analyze their inference 
that the mud loss was triggered by the earthquake. We rely on the observations 
Sawolo et al., (2009) summarize in their table 1 and their data in their figure 12. 
 
The arguments proposed in some studies for an earthquake trigger to the Lusi 


































































earthquake (Mazzini et al., 2007; Sawolo et al., 2009). These studies note that Lusi 
started erupting approximately 48 hours after the Yogyakarta earthquake and that 
partial losses were observed in Banjar Panji-1 seven minutes after the earthquake and 
use this as the sole basis for suggesting that Lusi was triggered by the earthquake. 
However, in previous work (Manga, 2007; Davies et al., 2008; Tingay et al., 2008), 
we have argued that an earthquake trigger can be ruled out because the earthquake 
was too small given its distance and that the stresses produced by the earthquake were 
minute (smaller than those created by tides and weather). However, there are in fact 
hydrological responses that are more sensitive to seismic shaking than the initiation of 
mud volcano eruptions. Examples include changes in the eruption behaviour of 
already-erupting systems such as geysers (e.g., Husen et al., 2004), mud volcanoes 
(Manga et al., 2009), and changes in the water level in wells (e.g., Roeloffs, 1998; 
Wang and Chia, 2008). Based on a global compilation of > 500 observations of 
changes in water level in wells, the Yogyakarta earthquake lies right at the threshold 
distance where changes in water levels in wells (changes in pore pressure) might be 




Figure 3 Global compilation of responses to earthquakes: blue squares show 
permanent changes of the water level in wells (data sources provided in Wang and 


































































tabulated in Manga et al., 2009). The red star indicate the location and magnitude of 
the Yogyakarta earthquake.  
 
The seismic energy density, a measure of the energy in the seismic waves 
available to cause a response, at this threshold distance is 4 orders of magnitude 
smaller than that needed to cause liquefaction (Green and Mitchell, 2004; Wang, 
2007) and two orders of magnitude smaller than that needed to initiate undrained 
consolidation (Ishihara, 1996). Any possible response of the Lusi mud volcano is thus 
unlikely to caused by consolidation or liquefaction.  More plausible are changes in 
permeability in which the dynamic strains or induced oscillations in fluid flow remove 
blockages in fractures or other pore space leading to an increase in permeabilty and 
thus permits a redistrbution of pore pressure. This mechanism is commonly invoked 
for a range hydrologic responses at such large distances from earthquakes (e.g., Mogi 
et al., 1989; Rojstaczer et al., 1995; Brodsky et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2004; Elkhoury 
et al., 2006), and would seem to be the most likely way in which the Yogyakarta 
earthquake could have influenced the subsurface in the Sidoarjo area. We now 
evaluate this possibility. 
 
Sawolo et al., (2009) claim a causal connection between the earthquake and 
mud loss, as recorded by mud logging data that show a loss of 20 barrels 7 minutes 
after the earthquake (their figure 12).  A time lag between earthquake shaking and 
hydrological responses is not unexpected if the response occurs at some distance from 
the well. Indeed, peak hydrological responses to earthquake often occur days after the 
earthquake, though changes typically do begin coseismically. Examples include 
changes in the water level in wells (e.g., Roeloffs, 1998; Brodsky et al., 2003; Manga 
and Wang, 2007) and changes in streamflow (e.g., Manga et al., 2003). Thus a lag of 
7 minutes is not in principle unreasonable. Can the occurrence of these changes be 
verified? 
 
The response of the well to subsequent earthquakes – the aftershocks of the 
Yogyakarta earthquake – provide an opportunity to test the hypothesis that the main 
shock triggered permeability increases. If the permeability increased, then subsequent 
responses should be sensed with even shorter time lags at the well because hydraulic 


































































show in their figure 12 that the losses occurred 2 hours after these aftershocks. It is 
possible that the aftershocks caused changes at greater distances from the well 
resulting in longer time lags, but given that the aftershocks were smaller than the main 
shock, they should not be able to change hydrogeological properties where a larger 
earthquake could not. Consequently, we disagree with the claim that “that losses that 
happened after the earthquake showed a compelling argument that a temporal 
connection exists between the earthquake and Banjarpanji well” (quotation from 
caption of figure 12). A quantitative consideration of the data presented in their figure 
12, specifically the timing of the hypothesized responses to Yogyakarta earthquake 
and its aftershocks, does not support the claim in Sawolo et al., (2009). 
 
We certainly agree with Sawolo et al., (2009) that the Lusi eruption occurred 
“in an area prone to mud volcanism”. The presence of other mud volcanoes in the 
region, and the right geological setting for mud volcanism, are clear. However, 
despite the Sawolo et al., (2009) implying a link between earthquakes and Lusi simply 
on the basis of similar timing, the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake was not the trigger. 
We must reiterate two key conclusions from previous studies: first, by comparison 
with every other documented example of triggered eruptions, the earthquake was too 
small given its distance to initiate an eruption (Manga, 2007); second, dozens to 
hundreds of other earthquakes caused more shaking at the eruption site without 
initiating an eruption (Davies et al., 2008). These two constraints remain the strongest 
arguments against an earthquake trigger. 
 




 May 2006 the well lost circulation (Davies et al., 2008; Sawolo et 
al., 2009).  The decision was then made to pull the drill bit out of the hole but 
crucially without verifying that a stable mud column was in place and it was done 
while very severe circulating mud losses were in progress.  It was this procedure that 
caused the kick.  Because there was a significant open hole section the ability to 
tolerate the kick („kick tolerance‟ or „drilling window‟) was small (0-2.3 MPa; Tingay 
et al., 2008).  The ability to tolerate a kick was further depleted as evidenced by the 
continuing severe mud loss. The kick probably occurred by sucking water and gas 


































































Severe swabbing is reported in their paper while pulling drill pipe and at the same 
time severe mud loss is reported while pumping during the trip.  
 
This is a critical part of their paper Sawolo et al., (2009) have deviated from 
the record of the daily drilling reports.  In the paper Sawolo et al., (2009) report „no 
apparent drag.  Unlikely to swab‟ (line 21 in Table 1), but in the daily drilling reports 
it states „worked pipe, pooh [pull out of hole] from 8700 ft to 8100 ft without 
circulation, overpull encountered over 30000 lbs‟.  Despite their statement „no 
apparent drag.  Unlikely to swab‟ the data from the well are perfectly clear, there was 
severe swabbing while the drill bit was being pulled out of the hole, which brought 
large quantities of formation fluids into the wellbore until the mud pressure in the well 
reduced sufficiently to allow a substantial ingress. The kick was inevitable as a result 
of a failure to identify the swabbing. A failure to react to the well flow resulted in the 
well being allowed to flow for 1.5 hours reaching a reported flow rate of 8,720 m
3
/day 
before the well was shut-in and the flow from the well stopped. The resulting 
magnitude of the kick had an influx volume of around 119 m
3
, including swabbed 
volume, (around 58% of hole volume). It can be of little surprise that the integrity of 




The main issues we contest are tabulated (Table 1). 
 











Leak off 16.4 ppg 
(19.29 MPa/km) 
Leak off 15.4 ppg 
(18.1 MPa/km) 
The inflexion point 
on the pressure 
build-up curve is 
the most 
appropriate 
measure of LOP.  







































































to derive 12.8 ppg 
(15.04 MPa/km) 
mud weight at 
base of hole 
the drill pipe to 




executed, as mud 
losses were taking 
place at the same 
time as filling up.  
Their method also 
relies on assuming 
that no influx came 
into the drill hole. 
Also it‟s a physical 
impossibility to 
have a significant 
kick when there is 
a pore pressure of 
12.8 ppg (15.04 
MPa/km) and the 







Advocated Not advocated Only appropriate 
for porous and 
permeable 
successions, and 
not tight welded 
volcanics as 
observed in the 






Advocated Not advocated Only appropriate 
for mudstone 
successions, and 



































































observed in the 







Advocated Not advocated Only appropriate 
for mudstone 
sequences and not 
tight welded 
volcanics as 
observed in the 
lower sections of 
the well.  
Well 
Design 
Their figure 8A 
shows „DESIGN 
PLOT –BASE 
CASE‟.  Inferring 
that that this was 




design was a 
significant 
deviation from 
the original plan 




design is in the 
public domain and 
illustrated in 




Proposed that 20 







aftershocks have a 
longer time delay 




too small and too 
far away. 
Swabbing  Report „no 
apparent drag.  









































































hole] from 8700 ft 




30000 lbs‟. In 
addition Table 2 
reports very large 
swabbed volumes 




Advocate that well 





Advocate well not 












any increase in 
annulus pressure 
and evidence for 
declining pressure 









Show that the well 
was killed and no 
fluid movement 
behind casing 
Do not show that 
the well was 
killed. 




fluids coming up 
the well above the 
plugs. 
Furthermore, fluids 
will only flow up 
the outside of the 
well if there is poor 
cementing of the 
casing and no other 






































































drill bit still 
stuck  
Indicates well in 
tact and no 
blowout occurring  
Does not 
indicates well in 
tact and that 
blowout was not 
occurring 
The drill bit can 




zones of highly 
swelling clays and 
in wells that have 
had large volumes 
of cement pumped 
into them 
Table 1.  Key data and interpretation that we dispute. 
 
We applaud the publication of some of the geological and drilling data from 
the Banjar Panji-1 well but disagree with the conclusion that drilling was not the 
cause of the Lusi mud volcano.  This ecological and humanitarian disaster was caused 




 May 2006, 
while there were losses and swabbing in the well, which triggered a very large kick 
that could not be controlled.  We can now be very specific about the critical errors 
which were a) having such a significant open hole section with no protective casing, 
b) overestimating the pressure the well could tolerate, c) after complete loss of returns, 
the decision to pull the drill string out of an extremely unstable hole d) pulling the bit 
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